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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Rebecca Lee Ahlers–Schaper, appearing pro se, appeals her conviction 
for possession of methamphetamine. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 On April 25, 2014, Ahlers–Schaper was pulled over for driving with a 
suspended license, and was arrested for Driving Without Privileges.  (R. vol. I, p. 
29.)  When asked whether she had anything illegal she admitted that she had a 
methamphetamine pipe in her purse.  (R. vol. I, p. 29.)  The arresting officer 
searched Ahlers–Schaper’s purse and found a pipe and a clear plastic bag 
containing methamphetamine.  (R. vol. I, pp. 29-30; 06/10/15 Trial Tr., p. 46, Ls. 
4-10, p. 66, Ls. 1-8.)  Ahlers–Schaper was charged by complaint with felony 
possession of a controlled substance in case number CR-2014-4915.  (R. vol. I, 
p. 25.)1 
That case was set for preliminary hearing on October 8, 2014, and was 
continued to October 22, 2014.  (R. vol. I, p. 26.)  At the second hearing, Ahlers–
Schaper requested that the court dismiss the case, and the State did not object 
to dismissal without prejudice.  (R. vol. I, p. 26.)  The state refiled the felony 
                                            
1 Ahlers–Schaper alleges numerous facts on appeal that are not supported by 
the record, ranging from complaints about the Washington State Department of 
Transportation, to allegations that law enforcement “placed a pipe amongst my 
personal possessions.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 1-4.)  Any claimed errors 
stemming from these unsupported facts should not be considered.  State v. 
Floyd, 159 Idaho 370, __, 360 P.3d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 2015) (“In the absence of 





charge as this case, CR-2014-6874, and a summons was issued on October 29, 
2014.  (R. vol. I, pp. 35-38.) 
Ahlers–Schaper made her initial appearance before a magistrate on 
December 5, 2014.  (R. vol. I, p. 44.)  She informed the court that she wished to 
be “assisted” by the public defender, but that she didn’t want them to “represent” 
her.  (R. vol. I, p. 44.)  The magistrate appointed the public defender but clarified 
on the order that “*NOTE – she wants it as standby counsel only.”  (R. vol. I, p. 
46.) 
Ahlers–Schaper’s preliminary hearing was held on December 24, 2014.  
(R. vol. I, pp. 63-64.)  Ahlers–Schaper began that hearing by objecting to her 
standby counsel, and stating that she did not request a public defender to “speak 
for” her.  (R. vol. I, p. 63.)  She alleged that she and her counsel could not agree 
on what was necessary in her defense, and that her standby counsel refused to 
assist her.  (R. vol. I, pp. 63-64.)  After noting that Ahlers–Schaper was verbally 
“abusing” her counsel, the magistrate concluded that Ahlers–Schaper wanted to 
represent herself, and excused her attorney.2  (R. vol. I, p. 64.)  The preliminary 
hearing proceeded, with Ahlers–Schaper representing herself, and she was 
bound over after a finding of probable cause.  (R. vol. I, pp. 64-65.) 
Ahlers–Schaper appeared for arraignment, pro se, on January 1, 2015.  
(R. vol. I, p. 67.)  She indicated that she was trying to obtain counsel, so the court 
continued the hearing.  (R. vol. I, p. 67.)  Ahlers–Schaper appeared, again pro 
se, on January 20, 2015.  (R. vol. I, p. 68.)  That hearing was also continued, 
                                            
2 The magistrate later entered an order, nunc pro tunc to December 24, formally 




again to give Ahlers–Schaper more time to find counsel.  (R. vol. I, p. 68.)  When 
Ahlers–Schaper was finally arraigned, on February 2, 2015, she had still not 
found counsel.  (02/02/15 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 2-5.)  Ahlers–Schaper explained that she 
was still trying to contact a group to represent her, and when asked by the district 
court whether she was “confident [she was] going to get legal help,” Ahlers–
Schaper responded, “Yeah.”  (02/02/15 Tr., p. 4, L. 6 – p. 5, L. 8.)  The district 
court entered a not-guilty plea, and set trial and pre-trial dates.  (02/02/15 Tr., p. 
5, Ls. 9-24.) 
On April 24, 2015, Ahlers–Schaper appeared, still pro se, at her pretrial 
conference.  (04/24/15 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 4-12.)  She informed the court she wanted 
counsel, “but I can’t afford to hire him.”  (4/24/15 Tr., p. 10, L. 23 – p. 11, L. 2.)   
The district court told Ahlers–Schaper that “we’ve gone a number of months. You 
need counsel. You can’t afford counsel. We need to get this case moving.”  
(04/24/15 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 10-12.)  In light of this the district court appointed the 
public defender as counsel.  (04/24/15 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 9-12.) 
Another pretrial conference was held on May 22, 2015.  (05/22/15 Tr., p. 
3, Ls. 2-6.)   The district court clarified at the outset of that hearing that the public 
defender had been appointed as actual counsel, and not as standby counsel, 
and Ahlers–Schaper’s counsel agreed that she “didn’t take it that [she] was 
standby.”  (05/22/15 Tr., p. 3, Ls. 7-22.)  Ahlers–Schaper objected to the 
appointment of counsel, “for a number of reasons,” and explained to the court 
that she wanted her counsel removed from her case.  (05/22/15 Tr., p. 3, L. 23 – 




represent myself than have Ms. Whitney represent me. Or come with an 
attorney.”  (05/22/15 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 9-11.)  But not long after that she stated, “Your 
Honor, I further request new counsel.”  (05/22/15 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 23-24.) 
The district court denied the request for new counsel, and explained, “You 
can’t have it both ways. You just said you wanted to represent yourself.”  
(05/22/15 Tr., p. 7, L. 25 – p. 8, L. 1.)  The district court further stated, “This is 
your counsel. I don’t appoint new counsel because you have some kind of—
because there have been some personality conflicts. You have competent 
counsel.”  (05/22/15 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 4-7.)  Ahlers–Schaper informed the court that 
she “refuse[s] to work with Ms. Whitney,” and again asked the court to remove 
her appointed counsel.  (05/22/15 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 16-17, p. 8, L. 25 – p. 9, L. 2.)  
The court replied: 
And that’s been denied. Several times now. Your choices are to 
have the public defender’s office, that’s our county public 
defender’s office, represent you, or to represent yourself or to hire 
your own attorney. 
 
(05/22/15 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 3-7.)  Ahlers–Schaper responded, “Well, then I will hire my 
own.”  (05/22/15 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 8-9.)  
 Ahlers–Schaper ultimately did not hire her own attorney, and continued to 
be represented by the public defender.  Despite having an attorney, Ahlers–
Schaper filed numerous motions on her own, three days prior to trial.  (R. vol. I, 
pp. 125-200.)  This included a “Motion to Dismiss I.C. 19-3501(1) and Lack Of 





Ahlers–Schaper’s case went to trial.  (R. vol. I, pp. 201-04; R. vol. II, 
pp. 258-66.)  The morning of trial, prior to jury selection, the court denied Ahlers–
Schaper’s various self-filed motions.  (06/08/15 Trial Tr., p. 2, Ls. 12-17.)  After 
the jury was selected, and again despite still being represented by the public 
defender, Ahlers–Schaper filed another motion on her own, this time to disqualify 
the court for cause.  (R. vol. II, p. 231-39.)  The jury ultimately found Ahlers–
Schaper guilty of possession of methamphetamine.  (R. vol. II, p. 269.) 
After trial, Ahlers–Schaper continued to file her own motions, including a 
Motion To Arrest Judgment For Lack Of Jurisdiction, and a Motion For New Trial 
For Lack Of Jurisdiction And Lack Of And Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel And 
Due Process Fundamental Errors.  (R. vol. II, pp. 271-82, 301-13.)  At a hearing 
on July 21, her attorney confirmed that she “had nothing to do with these 
motions.”  (07/21/15 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 6-9.)  Ahlers–Schaper continued to object to 
being represented by the public defender, and counsel moved to withdraw, which 
the court granted.  (07/21/15 Tr., p. 26, L. 6 – p. 27, L. 5.)  The district court 
denied Ahlers–Schaper’s motion to disqualify the court for cause, denied the 
motion “to arrest judgement,” and denied the motion for a new trial.  (07/21/15 
Tr., p. 34, L. 24 – p. 35, L. 14.) 
Ahlers–Schaper appeared pro se for sentencing on September 1, 2015, 
and was sentenced to three years probation, with one year fixed.  (09/01/15 Tr., 








 Ahlers–Schaper states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Is the “state of Idaho” recognized to be the constitutional 
State of Idaho, pursuant to Admission Bill of the State of 
Idaho, 26 Stat. 215, chapter 656, July 3rd, 1890? 
 
2. Did Magistrate Julian deny Appellant counsel/standby 
counsel at the preliminary hearing of December 24th, 2014 
in derogation of the Appellant’s right to counsel? 
 
3. Did Judge Buchanan abuse her discretion in failing to 
provide conflict free and competent counsel to the 
Appellant? 
 
4. Is there subject matter jurisdiction in accord with the 
Constitution of the State of Idaho and Constitution for the 
United States of America? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Did the district court have subject matter jurisdiction over Ahlers–
Schaper? 
 
2. Did the district court correctly deny Ahlers–Schaper’s untimely 
motion to dismiss for statutory speedy trial violations? 
 
3. Has Ahlers–Schaper failed to show that the removal of her standby 
counsel was a violation of her 6th amendment rights? 
 
4. Has Ahlers–Schaper failed to show that her counsel had a conflict 
of interest? 
 
5. Has Ahlers–Schaper failed to establish fundamental error on her 
unpreserved claim that the district court erred by not immediately 
hearing her motion to disqualify for cause? 
 















 Ahlers–Schaper claims, via several theories, that the district court did not 
have subject matter jurisdiction over her.3  Ahlers–Schaper first argues that 
initiating a criminal case via complaint is unconstitutional, and thus concludes 
that the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction over her. (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 11.) 
Ahlers–Schaper also appears to argue, as best can be gathered from her 
briefing, that the Idaho Code is unconstitutional and invalid wherever it uses 
“state of Idaho” to refer to state action, as opposed to “State of Idaho.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-21.)  Because much of the Idaho Code and criminal 
rules use the phrase “state of Idaho,” Ahlers–Schaper submits that “there is no 
political, legal, judicial, jurisdiction for the ‘state of Idaho’ for which the basis of a 
criminal action to even exist against the Appellant ….”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 21.4) 
Ahlers–Schaper’s jurisdictional arguments fail. This case was properly 
initiated by criminal complaint, and her notion that “there is no political, legal, 
                                            
3 Ahlers–Schaper couched several claims as challenges for “lack of jurisdiction” 
more generally.  But some of those claims do not seem to relate to subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Specifically, Ahlers–Schaper claims the district court had no 
jurisdiction because it allegedly failed to address her motion for disqualification, 
and because her preliminary hearing was allegedly untimely.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 6-11.)  While these two claims arguably touch on the district’s court’s ability to 
hear her case, they do not specifically concern subject matter jurisdiction, and 
are therefore taken up infra in sections II and V. 
 




judicial, jurisdiction for the ‘state of Idaho’” has no basis in law or fact. The district 
court consequently had subject matter jurisdiction over Ahlers–Schaper.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised 
at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review.”  State v. 
Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (citations omitted).   
 
C. The Case Against Ahlers–Schaper Was Properly Initiated By A Criminal 
Complaint 
 
 Subject matter jurisdiction, broadly defined, is a court’s “power to hear and 
determine cases.”  State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 
(2004) (citing Boughton v. Price, 70 Idaho 243, 249, 215 P.2d 286, 289 (1950)).  
The Rogers Court explained this well-settled principle: 
Article 5, Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution provides that the 
district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law 
and in equity. Idaho Code, § 1–705 grants the district court original 
jurisdiction in all cases and proceedings. “It is a familiar and well-
settled principle of law that the indictment must allege that the 
offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.” The 
information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was 
committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter 
jurisdiction upon the court. Subject matter jurisdiction to try a 
defendant and impose a sentence is never waived. The district 
court acquired subject matter jurisdiction over Rogers on August 4, 
1993, when the State filed the criminal complaint. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted, emphasis added.)  Moreover, “[g]enerally, once 
acquired by the court, jurisdiction continues until extinguished by some event.”  
Id. (citing McHugh v. McHugh, 115 Idaho 198, 199, 766 P.2d 133, 134 (1988); 




Here, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Ahlers–
Schaper. Ahlers–Schaper was charged with possession of methamphetamine 
within Idaho.  (R. vol. I, pp. 35-36, 61-62.)  Per Rogers, because there was an 
“information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within 
the State of Idaho” the district court accordingly had subject matter jurisdiction 
over Ahlers–Schaper. 
Ahlers–Schaper argues that the complaint somehow diminished the 
district court’s jurisdiction, but this fundamentally misses the mark; here, the court 
had subject matter jurisdiction because of the complaint.  Her mistake in claiming 
that a case may only be initiated by indictment or information stems from 
misreading the Idaho Constitution—the relevant constitutional provision does not 
refer to the “initiation” of a case, but rather states that “[n]o person shall be held 
to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on presentment 
or indictment of a grand jury or on information of the public prosecutor ….”  Idaho 
Const. art. I, § 8.  Idaho cases and statutes show that “held to answer” is a 
reference to a defendant’s arraignment: 
If, after hearing the evidence adduced at the preliminary 
examination, the magistrate finds that a public offense has been 
committed, and that there is probable or sufficient cause to believe 
the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate shall enter an order 
holding the defendant to answer to said public offense. 
 
I.C. § 19-815 (emphasis added); see also State v. Hendricks, 80 Idaho 344, 348, 
330 P.2d 334, 336 (1958). What happened here was exactly what the 
constitution requires: the state filed a complaint, then filed an information prior to 




arguments to the contrary, and her arguments that the district court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction, fail. 
D. Ahlers–Schaper’s Theories Regarding Capitalized Letters In State Names 
Are Meritless, And Have No Bearing On Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
 Ahlers–Schaper also presented lengthy argument below, and on appeal, 
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it is created by 
the Idaho Code, which refers to the state of Idaho as a lowercase “state of 
Idaho,” as opposed to a capitalized “State of Idaho.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-
21.)  Ahlers–Schaper claims that “the legislative department of the State of Idaho 
is derogation of [federal and/or constitutional law], when they use the term ‘state 
of Idaho.’”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 14.) She accordingly alleges that laws passed 
“for a non-existent ‘state of Idaho’” are without effect, and explains: 
What supposed State laws are we talking about? Pretty much 
everything that was not passed by the Territory of Idaho after July 
3rd, 1890, and which is not in conflict with the Constitution of the 
State of Idaho. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.) Ahlers–Schaper concludes that: 
The bottom line here is that there is no political, legal, judicial, 
jurisdiction for the “state of Idaho” for which the basis of a criminal 
action to even exist against the Appellant, pursuant to the 
Admission Bill of the State of Idaho, 26 Stat. 215, Chapter 656, July 
3rd, 1890. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 21.) 
 Ahlers–Schaper cites no legal authority affirming this theory, because 
there is none; therefore, her argument that the lack of capital letters in “state of 
Idaho” negates statutes, fails.  State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 




law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered . . . . A party waives an 
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are 
lacking.”). 
The Idaho Constitution vests legislative power in a senate and house of 
representatives, and gives the legislature the power to prescribe lower-court 
jurisdiction.  Idaho Const. art. III, § 1, art. V, § 2.  That same Constitution vests 
judicial power in Idaho’s courts, including its district courts.  Idaho Const. art V, 
§ 2.  Contrary to Ahlers–Schaper’s claims, the legislature’s use of a lower-case 
“s” does not nullify an otherwise constitutional statute, or affect the district court’s 
jurisdiction over her.5  See generally State v. L’Abbe, 156 Idaho 317, 318-21, 324 
P.3d 1016, 1017-20 (Ct. App. 2014). 
The district court had lawful jurisdiction over Ahlers–Schaper’s case and 
denied her claims to the contrary.  It did so correctly. 
II.  
The District Court Correctly Denied Ahlers–Schaper’s Untimely Motion To 




Ahlers–Schaper moved to dismiss this case for an alleged statutory6 
speedy trial violation, and she raises that issue again on appeal.  Her claim is 
                                            
5 The state also notes that this very Court is also creation of the state of Idaho. 
I.C. § 1-101 (providing that “The following are the courts of justice of this state: 1. 
The Supreme Court. 2. The Court of Appeals. 3.  The district courts ….”). 
 
6 Ahlers–Schaper’s brief refers to constitutional authorities and cites her 6th 
amendment rights, but the specific error she claims is statutory: she alleges that 
an  information was not filed within six months of her arrest as required by 
I.C. § 19-3501.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-11.)  She presents no argument or 




that because the information was not filed within six months of the arrest in her 
original case, that this case was therefore required to be dismissed per I.C. § 19-
3501.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9–11.) 
This argument fails for two reasons.  First, the district court correctly 
denied Ahlers–Schaper’s speedy trial motion as a procedural matter, because 
her motion was not timely filed pursuant to Rule 12(b).  In the alternative, Ahlers–
Schaper’s argument fails as a matter of substance, because her preliminary 
hearing was held within six months of the summons in this case, and was 
therefore compliant with I.C. § 19-3501. The district court therefore correctly 
denied her motion to dismiss.  
B. Standard Of Review 
 Trial court orders on motions to dismiss are reviewed using an abuse of 
discretion standard.  State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 184, 45 P.3d 838, 840 (2002). 
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial 
is a mixed question of law and fact.  State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d 
931, 933 (2000); State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 852, 153 P.3d 1195, 1198 (Ct. 
App. 2006).  The appellate court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact that are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely reviews the trial 
court’s application of the law to the facts.  Avila, 143 Idaho at 852, 153 P.3d at 
1198.  
                                                                                                                                  
to a speedy trial, and does not claim that the trial itself was untimely. To the 
extent Ahlers–Schaper means to frame her “speedy preliminary hearing” or 
“speedy information” claim in constitutional terms she has not supported it with 
argument on appeal, and has therefore waived that issue. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 




C. The District Court Correctly Denied Ahlers–Schaper’s Motion To Dismiss, 
Because Her Motion Was Not Timely Filed 
 
Per the Idaho Criminal Rules, defense objections that are “capable of 
determination without trial of the general issue may be raised before the trial by 
motion.”  I.C.R. 12(b).  Rule 12(b) motions “must be filed within twenty-eight (28) 
days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days before trial whichever 
is earlier.” I.C.R. 12(e). Trial courts may extend these deadlines for pretrial 
motions, but “only ‘for good cause shown, or for excusable neglect.’” I.R.E. 12(e).  
A court may not arbitrarily enlarge or shorten the filing requirements 
of the rule. To permit a court to do so without the required 
exempting factors would emasculate the intent of the rule. Pretrial 
motions are just that, motions to be disposed of prior to trial. 
Bringing such motions at the last minute unfairly deprives the 
responding party opportunity to gather evidence to meet the merits 
of the movant’s arguments. 
 
State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888, 712 P.2d 585, 589 (1985).  Accordingly, it is 
an abuse of discretion for a district court to consider a Rule 12(b) motion “which, 
for no good reason, was not timely filed.”  See id. 
Here, on June 5, the Friday afternoon before the Monday trial, Ahlers–
Schaper filed a “Motion To Dismiss I.C 19-3501(1) and Lack of Jurisdiction,” 
alleging statutory speedy trial violations.7  (R. vol. I, pp. 196–200.)  The motion 
asserted a violation of I.C. § 19-3501(1) because the information had not been 
filed within six months of the arrest.  (Id.)  The district court took up that motion, 
and several others, the morning of trial: 
THE COURT: Miss Ahlers–Schaper, we—you’re here this morning 
for trial. I note know that you have—you have filed a number of 
                                            
7 That same motion, in substantially similar form, was also filed with this Court on 




motions filed Friday afternoon pro se, they got filed on your own 
behalf even though you have counsel. The motions are not timely, 
and the motions are denied. 
 
(06/08/15 Trial Tr., p. 2, Ls. 12-17.) 
The district court correctly concluded that the motion was not timely filed, 
and did not abuse its discretion by denying it.  Ahlers–Schaper entered a 
not-guilty plea at her arraignment February 2, 2015, and trial began on June 8, 
2015.  (02/02/15 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 9-24; R. vol. I, p. 201.)  Ahlers–Schaper’s motion 
was a defense or objection “based on [alleged] defects in the prior proceedings in 
the prosecution” under I.C.R. (12)(b)(1).  Per Idaho Criminal Rule 12(e), Ahlers–
Schaper was required to file her motion to dismiss “within twenty-eight (28) days 
after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days before trial whichever is 
earlier.”  The earlier of those dates was twenty-eight days after Ahlers–Schaper’s 
entry of plea on February 2; thus, Ahlers–Schaper’s motion to dismiss was 
required to be filed by March 1, 2015.  Instead, Ahlers–Schaper filed her motion 
months later, on June 5—the Friday afternoon prior to a Monday trial—which 
made it 96 days late.  (R. vol. I, p. 196.)  Because her motion was not filed on 
time, and because neither Ahlers–Schaper nor her counsel presented good 
cause or excusable neglect for the late filing, the district court correctly denied it. 
Ahlers–Schaper attempts to bypass these timeliness requirements by 
framing her motion to dismiss as a jurisdictional claim.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-
11.)  She reasons that her motion “was brought timely as Motions challenging the 
jurisdiction can be brought at any time.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  This argument 




simply concerns state compliance with statutory speedy trial provisions.  And 
Ahlers–Schaper does not show how the state’s alleged failure to follow such a 
statutory provision would deprive or otherwise extinguish the district court’s 
ongoing jurisdiction.  Ahlers–Schaper’s motion was therefore required to be filed 
on time; because it was not, the district court did not err in denying it. 
D. Even If Ahlers–Schaper’s Motion To Dismiss Was Timely Filed, She 
Incorrectly Calculates The Time For State Compliance With I.C. § 19-
3501, And Her Motion Was Thus Correctly Denied As A Matter Of 
Substance 
 
Ahlers–Schaper’s motion to dismiss was untimely, and that alone is a 
basis for denying it.  But even if this Court determines the motion was timely filed, 
it nevertheless fails on substantive grounds. In her motion, Ahlers–Schaper 
alleged that the state did not file the information within six months after the arrest 
date in the original case, which she claims subjects the current case to dismissal 
per I.C. § 19-3501(1).  (Appellant’s brief, p. 9; R. vol. I, pp. 196–200.)  This is 
incorrect for the simple reason that the time for filing the information did not begin 
with the arrest in the dismissed original case; rather, it began with the filing of the 
summons in this case. 
The Court of Appeals addressed this very situation in State v. Mason, 
where a felony complaint was dismissed and refiled, and the appellant “was 
summoned to appear again.”  State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 661, 726 P.2d 772, 
774 (Ct. App. 1986).  The appellant argued, among other things, that his 
statutory speedy trial rights were violated.  Id. at 663, 726 P.2d at 775.  The 




Subsection (1) of I.C. § 19–3501 deals with the pretrial time frame 
from arrest to the filing of an indictment or information. It requires 
dismissal of the charge when no indictment or information is filed 
within six months of the defendant’s arrest. In this case, the 
information was filed six months and three days after Mason's 
arrest at the scene of the altercation. However, the original charge 
against Mason was dismissed on May 9, 1984. Rather than being 
rearrested, Mason received a summons to appear. Consequently, 
there was no second “arrest” to restart the running of the statute's 
six-month time limit. Because Mason was ordered to appear and 
answer for the charge of aggravated assault, we believe that the 
service of the summons was the functional equivalent of an arrest. 
Thus, the statutory clock began to run anew. The information was 
filed within six months of the service of the summons. Thus, we 
hold that I.C. § 19–3501(1) was not violated. 
 
Id. at 663, 726 P.2d at 775 (internal citations omitted). 
 Ahlers–Schaper’s statutory speedy trial arguments are quickly disposed of 
by the Mason Court’s holding. Here, Ahlers–Schaper’s original case was 
dismissed, this case was filed, and a summons was issued on October 29, 2014 
(R. vol. I, pp. 13, 25-34, 37-38.)  Per Mason, the issuance of the summons 
restarted the statutory clock and the state had six months thereafter to file an 
information.  And the state did exactly that, when it went to preliminary hearing 
and filed the information on December 24, 2015—well within the six-month 
timeframe.  (R. vol. I, pp. 61-65.)  Because the state had six months from the 
summons in this case to comply with I.C. § 19-3501(1), and did so, there was no 
statutory speedy trial violation here.  Consequently, Ahlers–Schaper’s speedy 
trial motion fails as a matter of substance. 
 The district court had both procedural and substantive grounds to deny 
Ahlers–Schaper’s motion to dismiss based on statutory speedy trial violations. It 





Ahlers–Schaper Has Failed To Show That The Removal Of Her Standby 




 Ahlers–Schaper argues that the magistrate abused his discretion by 
removing her counsel prior to preliminary hearing, and claims that doing so 
“violated a court’s order and Appellant’s right to standby counsel ….”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-28.)  This is incorrect, because the magistrate correctly 
removed Ahlers–Schaper’s standby counsel as a discretionary matter due to 
Ahlers–Schaper’s behavior and her statements that she wished to represent 
herself.  Moreover, Ahlers–Schaper has no constitutional “right to standby 
counsel.”  Consequently, Ahlers–Schaper has failed to show that the removal of 
her standby counsel was an abuse of discretion, or a violation of her 6th 
amendment rights. 
B. Standard of Review 
 
The state submits that the scope of Ahlers–Schaper’s putative “right to 
standby counsel” is a question of law over which “this Court exercises free 
review.”  See Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 
(2004) (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001)).  A 
district court’s decision whether to appoint standby counsel is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard.  See State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 886, 136 





C. The Magistrate Did Not Abuse His Discretion By Removing Ahlers–
Schaper’s Standby Counsel, And Ahlers–Schaper Had No Constitutional 
Right To Standby Counsel 
 
Indigent defendants have a right to court-appointed counsel, pursuant to 
both the “Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.”  State v. Suiter, 138 Idaho 662, 665, 67 
P.3d 1274, 1277 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
342-45, 83 S.Ct. 792, 795-97, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 803-05 (1963); Pharris v. State, 91 
Idaho 456, 458, 424 P.2d 390, 392 (1967).) 
However, defendants do not have a constitutional right to standby 
counsel.  The Idaho Court of Appeals considered this very question, where the 
appellant argued that “he has a fundamental right to standby counsel.”  Averett, 
142 Idaho at 886, 136 P.3d at 357.  The Court disagreed, and noted that the 
appellant “failed to provide authority for the proposition that the district court is 
constitutionally required to accommodate a defendant's wish to represent himself 
with the advice of standby counsel at the government's expense in order to avoid 
a violation of his right to appointed counsel.”  Id.  The Averett Court accordingly 
concluded: 
We agree that the appointment of standby counsel should be 
encouraged when a defendant elects to proceed to trial pro se. We 
find no authority, however, to support Averett’s proposition that the 
district court was constitutionally mandated to appoint standby 
counsel at Averett’s request. Thus, we hold that the appointment of 








Here, the magistrate did not abuse his discretion by removing Ahlers–
Schaper’s standby counsel, because he reasonably concluded that Ahlers–
Schaper no longer wanted her standby counsel to represent her.  The preliminary 
hearing minutes show the hearing began with a proclamation from Ahlers–
Schaper regarding her standby counsel: 
[Ahlers–Schaper]:  
HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY; I DID NOT REQUEST A PUBLIC 
DEFENDER TO SPEAK FOR ME; REQUESTED ASSIST ME IN 
MY OWN REPRESENTATION; CONTACTED MS WHITNEY FOR 
FIRST MEETING ON 22ND; FIRST TIME I WAS ABLE TO MEET 
WITH HER; SHE WAS NOT ABLE – THE ATTORNEY AND I DID 
NOT AGREE ON WHAT WAS NECESSARY FOR ME TO  




LET ME CUT TO THE CHASE 
IF IT WAS ME, YOU EITHER HAVE AN ATTORNEY OR YOU 
WOULDN’T; WOULDN’T PLAY THIS GAME 
EITHER HAVE ONE IN FULL SENSE OR NOT 
JUST LEADS TO STUFF I’M HEARING NOW 
IF YOU DON’T WANT AN ATTORNEY I’LL EXCUSE MS 
WHITNEY RIGHT NOW 
SHE HAS BETTER THINGS TO DO THAN LISTEN TO YOU 
WHINE ABOUT 
YOU CAN EITHER HAVE ATTORNEY OR GO HIRE ATTORNEY 
NOT GOING TO HAVE 




REFUSED TO ASSIST ME WHEN I WENT IN THERE 
 
[Judge]:  
THAT’S INCONSISTENT WITH STATEMENTS YOU MADE 
PREVIOUSLY 
WANT TO REPRESENT YOURSELF 
I DON’T HAVE TOLERANCE FOR THAT NONSENSE 
MS WHITNEY IF YOU WANT TO BE EXCUSED 
 




WOULD LIKE TO BE EXCUSED 
 
[Judge]:  
YOU’RE ABUSING ATTORNEY 




I ASKED FOR COURT APPOINTED ATTORNEY WHO WOULD 
ASSIST ME IN MY CASE 
 
[Judge]:  
YOU’VE HAD THAT AND ALL YOU CAN DO IS SIT THERE AND 
BAD MOUTH HER 
I DON’T TOLERATE THIS 
YOU DON’T APPRECIATE WHAT YOU’VE BEEN GIVEN 
 
[Ahlers–Schaper]:  
I HAVE RIGHT TO REPRESENT MYSELF; ALSO HAVE RIGHT 
TO COURT APPOINTED ATTORNEY 
 
[Judge]:  
YOU HAVE RIGHT TO ONE OR THE OTHER 
YOUR ATTORNEY EXCUSED 
 
(R. vol. I, pp. 63-64.)  The magistrate later entered an order vacating the 
appointment of the public defender, nunc pro tunc, formally removing Ahlers–
Schaper’s standby counsel.  (R. vol. I, p. 66.) 
 The magistrate did not abuse his discretion by entering this order, 
because he based the decision to remove Ahlers–Schaper’s standby counsel on 
her plain statements that she did not request a public defender to speak for her, 
and that she and her standby counsel didn’t agree on what was necessary in her 
defense.  Moreover, the magistrate noted that Ahlers–Schaper was “abusing” her 
attorney, and that despite having standby counsel, that Ahlers–Schaper was “bad 
mouthing” her counsel.  Given all of these facts, the magistrate could reasonably 




counsel, or was being abusive to her counsel, and in either case reasonably 
removed her standby counsel as a matter of discretion.    
Ahlers–Schaper argued below, and argues now, that the removal of her 
standby counsel violated her right to standby counsel.  (R. vol. II, pp. 276, 302; 
Appellant’s brief, p. 23.)  This argument fails in light of Averett.  Contrary to 
Ahlers–Schaper’s claims, she simply has no constitutional “right to standby 
counsel.”  The magistrate’s decision to remove Ahlers–Schaper’s standby 
counsel was therefore not a violation of Ahlers–Schaper’s constitutional rights. 
 The magistrate did not abuse his discretion by removing Ahlers–Schaper’s 
counsel, nor was Ahlers–Schaper entitled to standby counsel as a matter of 
constitutional right. Ahlers–Schaper has therefore failed to show that the 
magistrate erred by removing her standby counsel.8 
                                            
8 Ahlers–Schaper alternatively refers to her “right to standby counsel” and “right 
to counsel” in her briefing. (See, e.g., Appellant’s brief, p. 24.)  It is unclear 
whether she additionally intends to assert that she had a right to appointed 
counsel that was violated, in addition to a violation of her putative “right to 
standby counsel.”  To the extent she intends to present argument relating to 
appointed counsel on appeal, the attempt fails, for multiple reasons.  First, and 
fundamentally, Ahlers–Schaper plainly waived her Sixth Amendment right to 
appointed counsel at multiple points prior to the preliminary hearing.  (R. vol. I, p. 
44-45 (showing Ahlers–Schaper as saying “I wish to be assisted by public 
defender; don’t wish for them to represent me; Wish their assistance,” and “[I] 
want court to know [I] don’t want to be represented,” and attesting under oath her 
desire “to be assisted by court appointed counsel to represent myself. Request 
counsel to stand by in the case I need clarification ….).)  Ahlers–Schaper made it 
clear that she was initially requesting the assistance of standby counsel only, and 
that she did not wish for the public defender to represent her.  She was well 
within her Farretta rights to do so.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 
S.Ct. 2525, 2541 (1975).  Second, as a matter of coherent argument, Ahlers–
Schaper cannot simultaneously claim that she was denied access to appointed 
counsel, while claiming her standby counsel erred by filing a notice of 
appearance and discovery requests—or in other words, by doing exactly what 




D. Even If The Magistrate Erred By Removing Ahlers–Schaper’s Standby 
Counsel Prior To The Preliminary Hearing, That Error Would Be 
Harmless, Because It Had No Effect On Ahlers–Schaper’s Trial   
 
 The magistrate did not err by removing Ahlers–Schaper’s standby counsel 
prior to the preliminary hearing.  But alternatively, even if the magistrate did err, 
the removal of counsel would be harmless because it did not affect Ahlers–
Schaper’s trial. 
Unlike a denial of counsel at trial, the denial of counsel at preliminary 
hearing can be a harmless error.  State v. Wuthrich, 112 Idaho 360, 364-65, 732 
P.2d 329, 333-34 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 
S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970).) Such an alleged error will be held harmless 
when an appellate court is “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt” that the denial 
of preliminary hearing counsel “did not affect the result in trial.”  Wuthrich, 112 
Idaho at 364, 732 P.2d at 333.  
The Wuthrich Court applied this framework to a case in which the 
appellant was “not represented by counsel at the outset of his preliminary 
hearing,” but where the appellant “raised no issue pertaining directly to the trial at 
which he was found guilty.”  Id. at 362, 732 P. 2d at 331.  Focusing on the 
preliminary hearing, the Court of Appeals determined that the defendant was 
confused about whether he wished to proceed to preliminary hearing without an 
attorney, and that, accordingly, “the magistrate erred by electing to proceed” 
without one.  Id. at 364, 732 P.2d at 333. 
                                                                                                                                  
brief, p. 23.)  Lastly, even if the magistrate erred by not appointing counsel prior 
to her preliminary hearing, this alleged error would be harmless, for all the 




But the Wuthrich Court also concluded that this error was harmless, 
because it did not affect the trial outcome: 
In this case, during the preliminary hearing, Wuthrich endeavored 
ineffectively to cross-examine witnesses, including the victim. At 
various junctures in the hearing he made inappropriate and self-
defeating remarks. When Wuthrich’s inability to represent himself 
became obvious to the magistrate, the hearing was suspended and 
continued to another date. Wuthrich was represented by counsel 
when the hearing resumed. Additional opportunity to cross-examine 
the victim was provided. Furthermore, the state did not rely at trial 
on testimony given at the preliminary hearing. All witnesses called 
at the preliminary hearing testified afresh at the trial. 
 
The state’s case was strong. The testimony of the state’s witnesses 
was uncontradicted except by Wuthrich himself. We do not find, 
and Wuthrich has not identified, any evidence that he could have 
challenged more successfully at trial if counsel had been made 
available at the outset of the preliminary hearing. Accordingly, we 
are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the result of the trial 
would have been the same. We conclude that the initial lack of 
counsel at the preliminary hearing was harmless error. 
 
Id. at 364-65, 732 P.2d at 333-34. 
 Here, that same analysis applies, because there is no evidence that the 
removal of standby counsel affected Ahlers–Schaper’s trial.  Ahlers–Schaper 
was represented by counsel throughout her trial, and the sole witnesses called at 
her preliminary hearing “testified afresh” at trial.  (R. vol. I, p. 64; 06/10/15 Trial 
Tr., pp. 15-48.)  Much like the witnesses in Wuthrich, the state’s witnesses here 
gave trial testimony that was only contradicted by Ahlers–Schaper.  And here 
too, a review of the record does not show, nor does Ahlers–Schaper identify, any 




had been made available at the outset of the preliminary hearing.”9  Wuthrich,  
112 Idaho at 364-65, 732 P.2d at 333-34. 
 Consequently, even if the magistrate erred by removing standby counsel 
prior to the preliminary hearing, that decision did not affect the trial and was 
harmless. Ahlers–Schaper fails to show otherwise on appeal. 
IV.  




In what must be an alternate theory, Ahlers–Schaper claims that her 
erroneously-removed counsel was also erroneously appointed, despite 
“irreconcilable conflicts.”10  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-27.)  Ahlers–Schaper makes 
                                            
9 Ahlers–Schaper only argues “because I had no access to standby counsel I did 
not know the procedures to file motions until after the time had expired to file pre-
trial motions had run.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 2–3.)  She also offers the 
conclusory statement that “I had no counsel to file motions, which would have 
exposed the illegalities of the arrest and subsequent search, which would have 
changed the outcome of the case.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 2.)  But Ahlers–Schaper 
does not explain which motions she did not file, or filed too late, or their legal or 
factual bases, or how such motions would have affected the trial—or, critically, 
whether the public defender would have even made such filings at Ahlers–
Schaper’s behest.  And indeed, Ahlers–Schaper did have pretrial standby 
counsel prior to trial, leading up to the day of the preliminary hearing—and no 
such outcome-changing pretrial motions were filed by counsel.  Ahlers–Schaper 
presents no coherent argument that had she had standby counsel in the months 
of January and February, that such counsel would have filed meritorious motions 
that could have had any impact on the trial. 
 
10 Ahlers–Schaper also argues at length that her standby counsel was not 
competent, but these arguments are misplaced.  An appellate court will generally 
not review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel first raised on direct 
appeal “because claims of ineffective assistance of counsel regularly raise issues 
on which no evidence was presented at the defendant’s trial.”  State v. Saxton, 
133 Idaho 546, 549, 989 P.2d 288, 291 (Ct. App. 1999).  “The question of 
competency of counsel is an extremely complex factual determination which, in 




the related claim that it was “an abuse of discretion for Judge Buchanan to have 
ignored my timely Motion for New Counsel filed before trial ….”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 28.)  These arguments fail because there is no evidence that Ahlers–
Schaper’s counsel had a conflict of interest.  Moreover, the district court did not 
ignore Ahlers–Schaper’s repeated requests for substitute counsel, but 
considered them, and correctly denied them as a matter of discretion.  Ahlers–
Schaper fails to show this was an error. 
B. Standard of Review 
 
 A trial court court’s denial of an indigent defendant’s motion to appoint 
substitute counsel is reviewed with an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. 
Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 715, 52 P.3d 857, 860 (2002).  Such an abuse will be found 
“when the denial of the motion results in a violation of the defendant’s right to 
counsel.”  Id. 
 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Ahlers–Schaper’s Standby 
Counsel Had No Conflict Of Interest, Because There Is No Evidence In 
The Record Showing Such A Conflict 
 
 While criminal defendants have a constitutional right to counsel, “[t]he right 
to counsel does not necessarily mean a right to the attorney of one’s choice.”  
State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 594, 181 P.3d 512, 520 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Nevertheless, a district court may, “in its discretion, appoint a substitute attorney 
                                                                                                                                  
determination . . . . The resolution of those factual issues for the first time on 
appeal, based upon a trial record in which competence of counsel was not at 
issue, is at best conjectural.”  Id. (quoting Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 791, 
702 P.2d 826, 829 (1985) (Bakes, J., specially concurring).)  Accordingly, 
Ahlers–Schaper’s claims pertaining to her counsel’s competence, and allegedly 





for an indigent defendant,” upon a showing of “good cause.”  Id.  In making this 
determination, “[t]he trial court must afford the defendant a full and fair 
opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of a motion for 
substitution of counsel after having been made aware of the problems involved.”  
Id. (emphasis in original). 
In reviewing such a motion, prejudice to a defendant is only presumed “if 
the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively represented conflicting 
interests’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s 
performance.’”  State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 98, 967 P.2d 702, 712 (1998) 
(quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 
(1987).)  Such a defendant “bears the burden of showing ‘active representation 
of competing interests’ in order to establish a conflict of interest implicating the 
protection of the Sixth Amendment.”  Wood, 132 Idaho at 98, 967 P.2d at 712.  
Moreover, “[i]n addition to showing an active representation of competing 
interests, a defendant must show that an actual conflict adversely affected 
counsel’s performance.”  Id.  (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482, 98 
S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978).) 
The applicable conflicts of interest are found in the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  Wood, 132 Idaho at 98, 967 P.2d at 712.  In addition to 
specific prohibitions on business dealings and other relationships with clients, the 
Rules set out the general definition of a “conflict”: 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent 




(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to 
another client; or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or 
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third 
person or by the personal interests of the lawyer, 
including family and domestic relationships. 
 
Idaho R. of Prof. Conduct 1.7, 1.8. 
 Ahlers–Schaper argued below, and now argues on appeal, that her 
standby counsel was not “conflict-free.” She claims that: 
Over and over at each hearing I made it clear to Judge Buchanan 
that there were irreconcilable conflicts with Ms. Whitney being 
appointed as counsel. I objected at each hearing, wrote letters to 
Judge Buchanan of the irreconcilable conflicts and Judge Buchanan 
ignored my issues as she had done with everything else I raised. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 26.)  Ahlers–Schaper also presented these “irreconcilable 
conflicts” via a Motion To Have New Counsel Appointed In Accord With Law or In 
The Alternative Dismiss The Above Entitled Case For Failure To Appoint 
Counsel In Accord With Law.  (R. vol. I, pp. 130-43, 182-86.)  In this motion 
Ahlers–Schaper explained her criticisms of counsel in more detail.  She alleged 
that “[t]he problem has been and continues to be for the most part that the 
attorneys in the public defender’s office do not listen to my side of things, nor 
give me a voice in what I want them to do for me as I require….”  (R. vol. I, p. 
141.)  She also alleged that “when I complain about it to them, they come into 
court and make me the bad guy….”  (R. vol. I, p. 141.)  She contended “[m]ost 
importantly, I expect them to defend motions that I prepare for my defense and 
refuse to co-sign them. I need my counsel to be available to meet with me a 




The district court considered some of these same complaints previously 
asserted in a hand-written letter. (R. vol. I, pp. 77-81.)  The court replied and 
denied the request for new counsel in a letter sent on April 29, 2015: 
Dear Ms. Ahlers: 
 
I received and reviewed your letter regarding your request for 
appointment of conflict counsel outside the public defender’s office. 
I also reviewed your file and listened to the audio of the preliminary 
hearing in front of Judge Julian. The request is denied. At your 
behest, I reappointed the public defender’s office to represent you 
after Judge Julian had dismissed them and ordered that you 
represent yourself or hire counsel. I will not appoint conflict counsel 
as I do not find there is a conflict. Your options are to work with the 
public defender’s office so that they may effectively represent you, 
to represent yourself or to hire your own attorney. 
 
R. vol. I, p. 85.  The district court similarly denied Ahlers–Schaper’s pre-trial 
request for new counsel, and her motion in limine for new counsel.  (05/22/15 Tr., 
p. 8, L. 2 – p. 9, L. 7; 06/08/15 Trial Tr., p. 3, L. 21 – p. 4, L. 15.)   
The district court correctly found that there was no conflict of interest here.  
There is no evidence in the record that Ahlers–Schaper’s counsel had any active 
representation of competing interests, much less any evidence that her 
performance was adversely affected by such a conflict.  Nor is there any 
evidence that Ahlers–Schaper’s counsel had any disqualifying financial interests, 
directly adverse representations, or other materially limiting professional or 
personal interests or relationships.  Moreover, Ahlers–Schaper had a “full and fair 
opportunity” to present her facts and reasons in support of her requests for new 
counsel, and in fact had several such opportunities: she articulated complaints 
about counsel via letter and briefing, and by directly addressing the court at 




10, L. 3; 06/08/15 Trial Tr., p. 2, L. 7 – p. 3, L. 13, p. 6, L. 4 – p. 7, L. 24; 07/21/15 
Tr., p. 26, L. 8 – p. 27, L. 5)  The district court considered Ahlers–Schaper’s 
complaints, but, because there was no evidence of a conflict of interest, it 
correctly denied her requests for new counsel. 
 Ahlers–Schaper fails to show error because, while she presents a litany of 
complaints about her counsel, she does not point to any evidence of an actual 
conflict of interest.  (See R. vol. I, pp. 141-42.)  It seems that her argument rests 
on an erroneously broad definition of “conflict”—one encompassing personal 
disputes and disagreements.  A review of the record shows that Ahlers–Schaper 
and her counsel had extensive disagreements, maybe even irreconcilable ones, 
but a conflict in the interpersonal sense is not a legal conflict of interest.  Per 
Wood, Ahlers–Schaper has the burden of showing that her counsel had a conflict 
of interest as defined in the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and she has not 
done so.  The district court correctly concluded the same. 
V.  
Ahlers–Schaper Fails To Show That The District Court Erred By Not Immediately 
Hearing Her Motion To Disqualify For Cause, Much Less That That Decision 




Ahlers–Schaper submits that the district court erred because her mid-trial 
motion to disqualify the judge was not taken up in a timely fashion.11  (Appellant’s 
                                            
11 The district court ultimately heard this motion in a post-trial hearing and denied 
it, explaining to Ahlers–Schaper in its ruling that “I don’t find that you have any 
cause to disqualify the Court so I am not denying myself for cause.”  (07/21/15 
Tr., p. 35, Ls. 7-8.)   On appeal, Ahlers–Schaper does not argue that the district 
court’s ruling on her motion to disqualify for cause was erroneous.  (See  




brief, pp. 6-9.)  Ahlers–Schaper essentially argues that her motion should have 
stopped the trial proceedings, and should have been resolved before the court 
made any rulings, because after such motions are filed “the Judge in question no 
longer has authority to act on the case until the question of Disqualification has 
been decided.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) 
 Ahlers–Schaper’s argument on appeal, which was not raised at trial, is 
without merit.12  A review of the record shows the district court’s decision to 
continue with trial was not improper, much less fundamental error. 
B. Standard of Review 
 “It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.” 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).  Absent a 
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error 
under the fundamental error doctrine.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 
P.3d 961, 978 (2010). 
C. Ahlers–Schaper Has Failed To Show Any Error In The Court Not 
Immediately Taking Up Her Motion, Much Less Fundamental Error 
 
Under the Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion in Perry, unobjected-to claims 
of constitutional error are reviewed using a three-part test: 
                                                                                                                                  
Because Ahlers–Schaper does not contest the substance of the district court’s 
ruling on appeal, she has waived any such argument on appeal, and this 
response will accordingly address the claimed procedural error. 
 
12 After trial, Ahlers–Schaper claimed that the district court erred by proceeding 
with trial and not immediately taking up her motion to disqualify.  (See, e.g., 
07/21/15 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 6-13, 21-25.)  However, this objection was not timely 




(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
 
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted).  Consequently, “where an 
error has occurred at trial and was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, 
such error shall only be reviewed where the defendant demonstrates to an 
appellate court that one of his unwaived constitutional rights was plainly violated.”  
Id.  Ahlers–Schaper claims that the district court erred by proceeding with trial 
and not ruling on her motion to disqualify instead.  (Appellant’s brief, 6-9.)  She 
did not, however, raise this objection at trial.  Ahlers–Schaper’s claim fails 
because she cannot demonstrate fundamental error. 
 The first prong of the fundamental error test requires Ahlers–Schaper to 
demonstrate a constitutional violation.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.  
She cannot do so because the error she claims is not constitutional—it concerns 
timeframes provided by the Idaho Criminal Rules.  As Ahlers–Schaper points out, 
the criminal rules state that “[a]ny such disqualification for cause shall be made 
by a motion to disqualify,” which can be made at any time, and that “[u]pon the 
filing of a motion for disqualification, the presiding judge shall be without authority 
to act further in such action except to grant or deny such motion.”  I.C.R. 25(c), 
(e).  Thus, while the substance of a motion to disqualify could implicate Ahlers–




such a motion is defined by rule, not constitution.  Because Ahlers–Schaper 
cannot show that the district court’s alleged noncompliance with Rule 25 is a 
constitutional violation, she has not preserved this alleged error for review. 
 Likewise, the second prong of the fundamental error test requires Ahlers–
Schaper to demonstrate a clear or obvious error, and she cannot do so.  Perry, 
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.  Here, it was not a clear or obvious error for 
the district court to take up the motion after trial, because Ahlers–Schaper did not 
properly file her motion, or even alert the court to its existence during trial. 
 The Idaho Criminal Rules provide that “[t]he presiding judge or magistrate 
sought to be disqualified shall grant or deny the motion for disqualification upon 
notice and hearing in the manner prescribed by these rules for motions.”  I.C.R. 
25(c) (emphasis added).  Specifically, the criminal rules prescribe that written 
motions, such as motions to disqualify for cause, “shall be served upon each 
party and filed within the time and in the manner provided by the civil rules.”  
I.C.R. 49. 
 The civil rules state that unless ordered otherwise by the court or specified 
elsewhere in the rules, “[a] written motion, other than one which may be heard ex 
parte, and notice of the hearing thereon shall be filed with the court, and served 
so that it is received by the parties no later than fourteen (14) days before the 
time specified for hearing.”  I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) (emphasis added).  Lastly, the civil 
rules provide the following: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by 
an attorney shall be signed by at least one (1) licensed attorney of 
record of the state of Idaho, in the attorney’s individual name, 




I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 Based on these requirements, it is not clear or obvious that the district 
court erred by not hearing Ahlers–Schaper’s motion, because the motion was not 
properly filed.  Ahlers–Schaper’s motion—written pro se despite her being 
represented—was not served on the state, was not noticed up for hearing,13 and 
was never signed by her attorney.  (R. vol. II, p. 232.)  Per the Idaho Criminal 
Rules, and the civil rules they incorporate, the district court was only required to 
rule on the motion “upon notice and hearing,” and Ahlers–Schaper was further 
required to serve that notice, and her motion, and have her attorney sign these 
documents, all of which she did not do.  Because Ahlers–Schaper’s motion was 
not served, not noticed up for hearing, and was not signed by her attorney, it was 
altogether improperly filed.  The district court therefore did not obviously or 
clearly err by not immediately considering it; consequently, Ahlers–Schaper 
cannot show the second prong of the fundamental error test. 
 Moreover, it is not clear in the record that the court was even aware of the 
improperly filed motion to disqualify.  Ahlers–Schaper filed her motion in the late 
afternoon of June 9, the day after her trial began.  (R. vol. II, pp. 223, 231–39.)  A 
                                            
13 It is unclear what Ahlers–Schaper means when she asserts in her briefing that 
she “attempted to get the scheduling clerk to provide me with a hearing date for 
the Motion to Disqualify for Cause, but was denied access to the Court by her 
failing to provide the Appellant with a Court hearing date ….”  (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 7.)  Ahlers–Schaper contends that “within my Motion there is a section for 
Notice of Hearing in which it is noted across the page that ‘Clerk refused to 
provide me with a hearing date’ and is incorporated herein by its reference.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)  A review of her Motion to Disqualify for Cause filed on 
June 9 shows no such notice of hearing in her motion, and there appears to be 
no such evidence in the record that the court clerk refused to provide a hearing.  




review of the next day’s trial transcript shows no mention of the motion to 
disqualify, and it is unclear whether the district court, the state, or even Ahlers–
Schaper’s own attorney had actual knowledge of the motion, as Ahlers–Schaper 
never brought it up.  (06/10/15 Trial Tr.)  As the trial went on, Ahlers–Schaper 
never addressed her motion, or raised its issues, and never mentioned the 
district court’s purported inability to hear her case, despite personally testifying, 
personally addressing the court, and addressing the court through counsel.  (See 
06/10/15 Trial Tr., p. 8, Ls. 17-25, p. 11, Ls. 12-18, p. 83, L. 14 – p. 88, L. 13.)   
And it is clear from the record that Ahlers–Schaper was able to bring mid-
trial motions to her counsel’s attention, and did: Ahlers–Schaper’s counsel noted 
on the morning of June 10 that: “My client would like to move for a continuance 
because she feels that she needs Deputy Cotter from Bonner County Sheriff’s 
Office to testify.”  (06/10/15 Trial Tr., p. 11, Ls. 11-18.)  Had Ahlers–Schaper 
similarly wished for the district court to immediately address her disqualification 
motion, she should have said so, or at least brought it to her counsel’s attention, 
just as she did with her motion for a continuance.  The state submits that 
improperly filing a mid-trial motion to disqualify, not alerting the court to its 
existence, then later claiming the court should not have proceeded with trial, falls 
squarely within what the Perry Court deemed “sandbagging the court, i.e., 
‘remaining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if the 
case does not conclude in his favor.’”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d 976.  
Therefore, this claim fails on the second prong of the fundamental error test, 




 Lastly, Ahlers–Schaper cannot show that the district court’s decision to 
hear her motion after trial affected any of her substantial rights, let alone affected 
the trial.  Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.  The district court ultimately denied Ahlers–
Schaper’s motion, and Ahlers–Schaper shows no evidence that the district court 
would have granted her motion, and appointed a different judge, had the court 
only heard the motion sooner.  Because Ahlers–Schaper does not show that a 
quicker resolution of her motion would have resulted in the motion being granted, 
changed the trial outcome, or otherwise affected her substantial rights, she 
cannot meet the final requirement to show fundamental error.14 
 Ahlers–Schaper claims that the district court erred by not taking up her 
motion to disqualify for cause, but did not make that objection at trial.  Because 
she cannot show that the court erred, much less committed fundamental error, 
she fails to preserve that claim on appeal. 
VI.  
Ahlers–Schaper Is Not Entitled To Attorney Fees On Appeal 
 
Despite appearing pro se, Ahlers–Schaper requests attorney fees on 
appeal.  She cites I.A.R. 41(d), which allows paralegal fees to be awarded to 
represented parties, and submits that: 
For a great part of this case the Appellant has secured the 
assistance of a paralegal/specialized legal assistant to do most of 
                                            
14 Alternatively, in the event Ahlers–Schaper has preserved this issue for review 
on appeal, any alleged error of the district court would be harmless for these 
same reasons.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (“If the defendant 
meets this burden then an appellate court shall review the error under the 
harmless error test, with the defendant bearing the burden of proving there is a 





his[15] writing, research, and preparation of oral arguments before 
the court. Appellant asserts that should he prevail on Appeal he 
should be able to get attorney fees for his services as provided by 
the paralegal/specialized legal assistant. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) 
This argument fails.  No statutory authority allows for costs or attorney 
fees in criminal cases, and as a result Idaho courts “presently have no authority 
to award costs and attorney fees in criminal cases on appeal.”  State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856, 861, 153 P.3d 1202, 1207 (Ct. App. 2006); see also 
I.C. §§ 12-120, 12-121.  Even if this Court could award attorney fees in a criminal 
case, Ahlers–Schaper is not represented by an attorney, and Idaho Courts “have 
long held that pro se litigants are not entitled to attorney fees.”  Michalk v. 
Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 P.3d 580, 591 (2009).  Regardless of who 
wrote the appellant’s brief, her fee request—or “his” fee request—is meritless. 
  
                                            
15 The brief-drafter—who may or may not be the appellant—loses hold of the 
correct pronoun at times, which results in curious references to “his writing” and 
claimed fees “should he prevail on Appeal.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 5 (emphasis 
added).)  In all likelihood, these are conspicuous clues verifying Ahlers–
Schaper’s admission—or perhaps, her ghostwriter’s admission—that “most of” 







 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district 
court. 
 DATED this 28th day of June, 2016. 
 
 
      ___/s/ Kale D.  Gans____ 
      KALE D. GANS 
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